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Abstract 
The emergence of the New Consensus in monetary policy has been followed by a 
renewal of interest in central banks’ operating procedures, and specifically in the 
role of open market operations. There is a general view that overnight interest 
rates are most effectively controlled by standing or discount window facilities, 
rather than open market operations, and this view will probably now extend also 
to lender-of-last-resort intervention. The paper argues that this reduced role for 
open market operations is only in the context of controlling overnight rates of 
interest. In spite of the emphasis on control of overnight interest rates, medium 
and long-term interest rates remain the crucial instruments in the monetary 
transmission mechanism. Longer-term interest rates are susceptible to influence 
by open market operations, and their importance grows with financial 
development. 
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1 Introduction 
The arrival of the ‘New Consensus’ as the guiding doctrine for monetary policy 
has coincided with a renewal of interest in the ways in which that monetary policy 
is implemented. Such a coincidence is not really surprising. It is obvious that the 
replacement of one guiding doctrine, laying out the effects of monetary policy on 
an economy, by another doctrine is not just decided by policy considerations, but 
also usually involves some re-examination of the way in which monetary policy is 
implemented. The practical operation of a guiding doctrine of the past is usually 
re-examined to show that not just administrative failures are responsible for the 
flaws in previous monetary policy. At the same time central bankers need clear 
procedures for the implementation of the new policy. The last change of monetary 
regime, the switch to controls of monetary aggregates during the 1970s, was also 
anticipated by the critique of monetary operations from Milton Friedman and 
guidelines for the operation of new policy from William Poole (Friedman 1959, 
Poole 1970). The monetary procedures for the previous regime of active, 
Keynesian monetary policies after the collapse of the gold standard, and 
procedural errors in gold standard operations, had been clearly laid out by 
Hawtrey and Keynes himself (Hawtrey 1938, Keynes 1930, Keynes 1945). 
 Similarly, the embrace by policy-makers of a ‘New Consensus in Monetary 
Policy’, the view that a central bank should set the short-term (overnight) rate of 
interest by regard to some target for future inflation, has also been associated with 
critiques of monetary policy procedures under the previous regime targeting 
monetary aggregates (eg Bindseil 2004). Indeed, such discussion of their 
operating procedures has been invited by central bankers as a way of clarifying 
their obligations. For example, in a recent speech to Lombard Street Research, the 
Bank of England’s Executive Director for Markets, and member of the Bank’s 
Monetary Policy Committee, Paul Tucker urged further research in this direction: 
‘The overall historical picture is not especially coherent. I suggest that the 
question of whether desirably or even optimally, there might be some mapping 
from monetary regimes to operating frameworks warrants research by the 
academic community.’ (Tucker 2004, p. 372. Tucker refers to the Bank’s 
procedures as its ‘operating system’, an intriguing example of the influence of 
technology on language.) 
 This paper looks at the role of open market operations in the ‘New 
Consensus’ system of monetary policy, both in central bank procedures and in the 
putative influence of monetary policy on the economy at large. The first section 
examines the place of open market operations in the central bank balance sheet. 
The second section summarises the New Consensus Monetary Policy and the 
reduced role offered to open market operations by prominent proponents of such 
policy. The third and fourth sections of the paper look at the implementation of 
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monetary policy, and how the optimum open market operations change the rate of 
interest is the operational target of monetary policy. A fifth section of the paper 
considers the effect of financial development on the liquidity of financial markets, 
and the demand for central bank reserves. A sixth section discusses lender of last 
resort facilities. The seventh section considers the impact of open market 
operations on the yield curve. The paper concludes by arguing that the operating 
procedures implied by the New Consensus on monetary policy, giving a reduced 
role to open market operations, may not be entirely appropriate for developing 
and newly-industrialised countries, and may give a somewhat too narrow view of 
open market operations in reserve currencies. 
 
 
2 Open market operations in the central bank 
balance sheet 
A useful starting point for a systematic examination of the role of open market 
operations is the balance sheet of a central bank. This offers, as will become 
apparent further in the paper, a framework in which to place current theory on 
monetary policy and operations. Following Bindseil (2004) the balance sheet may 
be divided up into two sections. First of all, there is an autonomous balance sheet 
whose elements are items over which the central bank has little day-to-day 
influence, although it may affect the composition of some of these items, for 
example, through the bank’s choice of foreign currencies to hold in its reserves. 
(These are further discussed in section 4). 
 It should be pointed out that, although these autonomous elements have been 
separated out from ‘monetary policy operations’, this does not mean that those 
elements do not have monetary significance. Banknotes in circulation clearly have 
monetary significance. But it is now widely accepted that the amount of 
banknotes in circulation is determined by nominal incomes and how much of 
those incomes is required in cash. For countries operating a currency board, or 
just seeking to stabilise their exchange rate, foreign currency reserves have clear 
domestic monetary impact. But such countries are largely marginal to the existing 
largest monetary areas of the United States, the Euro-zone and possibly also the 
U.K., whose respective monetary policies have the largest impact on the 
international financial system. Furthermore, the movement in government 
deposits may have a significant monetary impact: tax and other revenues involve 
transfers from commercial bank reserves to the account of the government 
Treasury at the central bank; government expenditures transferring sums from the 
Treasury to the accounts in commercial banks of recipients of government 
payments; and sterilisation operations, in which government deposits are moved 
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from (or to) commercial banks in order to reduce (or increase) bank reserves. 
(These are further discussed in section 4). 
 Thus the section of the balance sheet headed monetary policy operations is 
really that part which summarises those monetary operations that are currently 
thought to be of significance among the major central banks whose practices 
inform contemporary monetary theory. In particular they may give a misleading 
impression of the main monetary policy operations of smaller central banks, and 
central banks in developing and newly-industrialised countries. 
 Until recently the most important section of the central banks’ monetary 
policy operations balance sheet was that of the reserves of banks and monetary 
institutions. These are the deposits of commercial banks, which they use to clear 
payments with each other, and to withdraw banknotes from the central bank. 
(There is thus a significant connection between these reserves and the ‘banknotes 
in circulation’ liabilities item in the autonomous balance sheet. When banknotes 
in circulation increase, for example when people withdraw extra cash in advance 
of major holidays, commercial banks obtain additional banknotes from the central 
bank, and payment for them is debited to the commercial banks’ reserve accounts 
at the bank). However important and visible may be the circulation of banknotes 
and payments in the economy, in practice the reserves needed for such circulation 
are insignificant: The total reserves of the commercial banks in the U.K. in 2004 
amounted to £45 million, against which daily payments totalling over £150 billion 
were made through the CHAPS payment system (Tucker 2004, p. 361). The 
central bank reserves of the commercial banks, together with the item banknotes 
in circulation, have had a disproportionate importance for monetary policy, 
because these two items constituted the ‘monetary base’, ‘high-powered money’, 
or ‘outside money’ whose control was the central tenet of the monetarist view that 
is more precisely described as the ‘reserve position doctrine’ (Meigs 1962, 
Patinkin 1965, pp. 295–300). 
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Central bank balance sheet 
 
OMO = Open Market Operations 
 
Assets Liabilities 
1. Autonomous balance sheet  
Gold & Foreign currency Banknotes in circulation 
Investment assets Government deposits 
Other assets Other liabilities 
Capital and reserves  
2. Monetary policy operations  
OMO I (liguidity-injecting reserve 
operations – purchases) 
OMO I (liquidity-absorbing reverse 
operations – sales) 
OMO II (outright holding of securities 
from past liquidity injections) 
OMO II (liquidity-absorbing central 
bank paper issued) 
Liquidity-injecting standing facilities 
(borrowing facilities) 
Liquidity-absorbing standing facilities 
(deposit facilities) 
Operational reserves Reserves of banks & monetary 
institutions 
Source: Bindseil (2004), p. 48, rearranged. 
 
 
The second, and increasingly important section of the monetary policy operations 
balance sheet are the standing facilities. These facilities allow commercial banks 
to borrow reserves from the central bank, or to place excess reserves on deposit at 
the central banks. Standing facilities are a way in which commercial banks can 
influence at their discretion the balance sheet of the central bank, since decisions 
to use standing facilities are made by commercial banks, rather than a central 
bank. 
 The main part of the monetary policy operations balance sheet shows open 
market operations divided into two sections. The first, OMO I, consists of reverse 
purchase (repurchase) or sale agreements with participants in the money market. 
A purchase agreement, for example, involves the purchase of risk-free longer-
term securities, for example government bonds, for which payment is added to the 
reserves held at the central bank of the counterparty bank. The agreement then 
specifies the sale of those securities back to the central bank after a certain period. 
In the European Central Bank’s practice this was initially two weeks, but is now 
one week. The difference between the purchase and sale price is in effect the rate 
of interest on the temporary addition to its reserves that the counterparty bank 
now obtains. This rate of interest on repurchase agreements (‘repos’) is now the 
official rate of the European Central Bank and the Bank of England. These open 
market operations may be repurchase agreements, providing reserves to 
counterparty banks, or they may be reverse sale agreements, reducing the reserves 
of banks. 
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 For central banks, repurchase agreements have the attraction that reserves 
supplied are not supplied as loans to counterparty banks but are exchanged for top 
quality assets from banks’ portfolios. Their other attraction is that they allow 
central banks to inject (or withdrawal) reserves over a fixed time horizon. This 
temporary accommodation offers central banks a way of acceding to any current 
requirement for reserves from commercial banks, without commitment to provide 
such reserves in the future. Such a commitment to provide all necessary reserves 
in the future is considered to remove the incentive to sound bank management that 
a reserve system is supposed to provide. (‘… an efficient, safe and flexible 
framework for banking system liquidity management … should retain incentives 
for banks to manage their own liquidity actively and prudently.’ Bank of England, 
2004, p. 218). 
 Once repurchase agreements are in operation, then obviously their effect on 
the money markets is the net outstanding amount at any one time. So if there are 
weekly repurchase agreements, the central bank’s manager responsible for money 
market operations decides, when the agreements expire, whether to renew them, 
or increase or decrease their amount. An increase in the amount of purchase 
agreements (or decrease in sales agreements) would supply additional reserves. A 
decrease in purchase agreements outstanding (or increase in sales agreements) 
would reduce bank reserves. 
 The other kind of open market operations are the outright purchases and sales 
of securities without commitment to sell or buy back the securities bought or sold. 
These are longer-term portfolio operations of central banks, and may include 
central bank issues of their own paper, for example, the short-term Euro notes that 
are issued by the Bank of England. 
 Whereas standing facilities are a way in which commercial banks can 
influence at their discretion the balance sheet of the central bank, open market 
operations are attempts by central banks to manipulate the balance sheets of 
counter-party banks. Since the make-up of their balance sheets is a commercial 
decision for those banks, central bank attempts to manipulate them require the 
consent of counter-parties. Hence, auctions are used for open market operations, 
with commercial banks being invited to tender for the securities that the central 
bank wishes to buy or sell. This has given rise to a modest, but significant, 
academic literature on the conditions under which commercial banks will ‘over-
bid’  or ‘under-bid’ for the securities offered up for sale or purchase by the central 
bank (eg Ayuso and Repullo (2001). (Themes in recent research are brought 
together in Välimäki 2003, and Bindseil 2004, chapter 5). Needless to say, 
significant factors in over-bidding or under-bidding are the interest rates payable 
for standing facilities, or available in the money market (the alternative source of, 
or repository for, reserves). 
 (In personal correspondence, Charles Goodhart has pointed out that the effect 
of open market operations is the same irrespective of whether counter-parties are 
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settlement banks or other, non-bank, financial institutions. In fact, once a 
distinction between settlement and non-bank financial institutions is introduced, 
then open market operations may be used to force changes in their balance sheet 
upon settlement banks, regardless of their preferences. For example, the sale of 
bonds to a non-bank financial institution would be settled by a transfer from the 
reserves at the central bank of that institution’s bank. Thus bank balance sheets 
may be changed even without their active participation in the open market 
operations of central banks). 
 The central bank balance sheet may be summarised as the following identity: 
 
tttt ABMR ++≡  (2.1) 
 
where 
Rt stands for Reserve holdings of banks, 
Mt stands for Net Open Market Operations Position, 
Bt stands for Net Standing Facilities, 
At stands for Net Autonomous Factors. 
 
Without further information, no causal inference may be made from this identity. 
However, it is used below as a convenient summary of the respective positions of 
different central banks on the role of open market operations in today’s markets. 
 
 
3 New consensus model of monetary policy 
The new consensus on monetary policy may be briefly summarised as setting 
interest rates to secure target rates of inflation. This consensus emerged during the 
1990s following the abandonment of the previous guiding doctrine of monetary 
policy, the view that the purpose of monetary policy is to manage the inflation 
through control of the money supply (however defined, given the range of money 
aggregates). (In fact the statement in a key text of that period, ‘virtually all 
economists agree that there is an important role for public authority in managing 
the nation’s high-powered money’ (Goodfriend and King 1988, p. 244) was never 
true of all economists and central bankers and suggests caution in the use of the 
word ‘consensus’.) In that doctrine, changes in that money supply were then 
supposed to affect inflation and the output gap. 
 The current view, termed the ‘new consensus’, may be derived from a simple 
macroeconomic model in which current inflation, πt, is some function of the 
previous period’s inflation and ‘output gap’; xt-1; a vector of exogenous variables, 
zt; and some random variable, εt 
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ttz1tx1tt zx ε+α+α+π=π −−  
 
where αx is some positive parameter; and αz is a row vector of parameters; and εt 
is an identically independently distributed random variable with mean 0, and a 
given variance. 
 In turn, the output gap is measured as a function of the previous period’s 
output gap; the vector of exogenous variables; the difference between the current 
real rate of interest, jt; the natural or equilibrium rate of interest that keeps the 
price level stable; and some random variable ηt. 
 
ttrtz1txt )rj(zxx η+−β−β+β= −  
 
where ηt is an identically independently distributed random variable, with mean 0, 
and a given variance and βx > 0 ; βr > 0. 
 The inflation function and the output gap equation can be combined and re-
arranged to give an equation showing the impact of monetary policy operations on 
future inflation (πt – πt + 1) 
 
rx
t
r
t
rx
1tz
r
tz
r
1tx
rx
1tt
t
zzx)(rj βα
ε+β
η+βα
α+β
β+β
β+βα
π−π=− +−+  (3.1) 
 
If expected values are put in for the future inflation, πt+1, and future exogenous 
variables, zt+1, then this can transformed into a dynamic equation showing 
forward-looking monetary policy operations. New Classical economists tend to be 
rather sanguine about the foresight of ‘agents’, whereas central bankers largely 
accept that such foresight is largely based on past experience. If the lag structure 
is changed and future exogenous factors are reduced to zero, then a Taylor Rule 
for monetary policy may be obtained. If the lags and equation are re-arranged to 
put future inflation or the output gap as the dependent variables, then an equation 
for the monetary transmission mechanism may be obtained. Given the 
autocorrelation and collinearities in business cycle data, different versions of this 
equation find support in econometric studies. 
 It is also worth pointing out that the time subscript in equation (3.1) is a 
period average, rather than the point time subscript in identity (2.1). This does not 
mean that the two equations cannot be combined by, for example, averaging the 
central bank balance sheet over an extended period. However, such a combination 
may not be very illuminating where the clear focus of monetary policy is the over-
night rate of interest, that is supposed to be managed by relatively frequent 
balance sheet operations. It is unlikely that meaningful series for inflation, and the 
output gap, not to mention unspecified exogenous variables, could be obtained for 
such short periods. 
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 The operating target of New Consensus policy-making is the over-night rate 
of interest, as opposed to the money supply in the previous doctrine. The new 
system is a major and welcome simplification in economic modelling, since the 
relationship between the interest rates that are the independent variables in models 
of the monetary transmission mechanism and the money supply, while elegant in 
theory, always proved troublesome in practice. Charles Goodhart has remarked in 
the past on the tendency of the money supply to elude control, and the Volcker 
experiment from 1979 to 1982 in stabilising the monetary base also succeeded in 
destabilising the interest rates through which monetary policy was supposed to be 
transmitted to the rest of the economy. Since changes in the money supply were 
supposed, in any case, to operate through the rate of interest (the IS component of 
macroeconomic models, from which the Phillips Curve was derived), it makes 
sense where possible to control that rate of interest directly. This then leads onto 
an examination of how interest rates can be controlled, and the role of open 
market operations in that system of control. 
 
 
4 The optimum level of open market operations 
Central banks have relatively little direct control of interest rates. As was 
indicated in section 1 of this paper, operations in the money market, where over-
night interest rates are set, require the co-operation of counter-party banks. In the 
case of the longer-term rates that are crucial for the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism, the influence of central banks is even more tenuous. Even the Bank 
of England’s Bank Rate under the gold standard, which is sometime referred to by 
partisans of the ‘New Consensus’ as the golden age of interest rate targeting (eg 
Bindseil, 2004, pp. 10–16; Tucker 2004, Appendix 3; Woodford 2003, 93–94), 
regularly lagged behind money market rates. Indeed, once it became clear that 
money market interest rates, rather than the amount of base money, were the 
targets of central bank monetary operations, the practical need to concentrate 
money market rates around the central bank’s preferred rate became a key factor 
in changing central bank operating procedures, both in the Euro-zone, and in the 
U.K. The setting of an official discount or lending rate may of course have a 
significant ‘signalling’ effect in the money markets. But, without operations in the 
money markets, such signalling may have only a marginal impact on interest rates 
in those markets (Friedman 1999). 
 As section 1 of the paper indicates, operations in the money markets may be 
conducted through open market operations, or through the use of standing 
facilities, sometime also called the discount window. The previous, monetarist, 
monetary policy regime, undoubtedly favoured the use of open market operations. 
In part this was a legacy of the 1930s, when open market operations seemed to 
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offer a direct way of counteracting a catastrophic credit contraction (Hawtrey 
1938, Simons 1946). This preference for conducting monetary policy through 
open market operations was encouraged in recent central bank practice through 
the influence of Simons’ most prominent student, Milton Friedman. Even prior to 
the monetarist regime, open market operations were a favoured way of 
implementing policy. For example, in the early 1980s the Bank of England 
described its monetary operations as: 
 ‘…setting, and periodic variation, of an official discount or lending rate, 
which, when necessary, is “made effective” by open market operations in the 
money market. “Making Bank rate effective” means restraining a decline in 
market rates from an unchanged Bank rate, or bringing them up to a newly 
established and higher Bank rate; it is accomplished by limiting the availability of 
cash to the banking system so as to “force the market into the Bank” to borrow at 
the somewhat penal rate of Bank rate.’ (Bank of England, 1983 p. 213) 
 Under the monetarist regime, the conduct of monetary policy operations was 
supposed even to exclude standing facilities, or discount window operations. As 
an authoritative paper by Goodfriend and King on U.S. Federal Reserve policy 
argued ‘the discount window is unnecessary for monetary policy… …Open 
market operations are sufficient for the execution of monetary policy. It follows 
that unsterilized discount window lending is redundant as a monetary policy tool.’ 
This was followed by a cautionary note: ‘Nevertheless, over the years the Federal 
Reserve has employed unsterilized discount window lending extensively, together 
with discount rate adjustments, in the execution of monetary policy. Though it 
remains puzzling, use of the discount window this way seems to be connected 
with the use of secrecy or ambiguity in monetary policy.’ (Goodfriend and King 
1988; see also Schwartz 1992). In fact, the diversity of banks in the different 
regions of the Federal Reserve system has traditionally been a factor in the use of 
the discount window in the U.S. 
 This approach can be summarised by re-arranging the central bank balance 
sheet identity (2.1) to yield 
 
)BR(AM tttt −+−≡  (4.1) 
 
An implication of this approach was that the term in brackets, the balance between 
changes in the reserves position of commercial banks (member banks in the case 
of the Federal Reserve), Rt, and discount window operations, Bt is negligible. 
Thus the autonomous shifts in liquidity of the banking system, At, were supposed 
to evoke the targeted amount of reserves from the central bank or, in the case of 
the Bank of England’s policy, were supposed to force the money market banks to 
borrow from the Bank at its preferred rate. 
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 In a somewhat confessional (for a central banker) aside the Bank of England’s 
Executive Director for Markets admitted: ‘With no deposit facility… the OMO 
rate was a natural way to express policy and we slipped into thinking of it as how 
we actually implemented policy too. That was a fallacy.’ (Tucker 2004). 
 The ‘New Consensus’ view of monetary policy has reversed the accepted 
view on the relative importance of open market operations and standing facilities. 
If standing facilities are available to participants in the money market, then the 
standing deposit and borrowing rates form a ‘corridor’ between which the market 
rate will fluctuate. How it will fluctuate depends on the other elements in the 
balance sheet identity (2.1), namely the amount of reserves that banks need on any 
one day; the amount and frequency of open market operations; and the credit 
activities of banks. For convenience this last is sometimes modelled as a 
stochastic variable (eg in Davies 1998). If minimum reserves are required to be 
held at the end of every day, and that minimum is sufficiently large in relation to 
the daily fluctuation in credit activities, then, without accommodating open 
market operations, the overnight rate in the money market will tend to the upper 
and lower bounds of the corridor. One way of moderating this drift to the margins 
is allow banks to average their reserve requirements over a maintenance period. In 
that case, the overnight rate will fluctuate between the deposit and lending rate, 
but will tend to end up on one of the corridor margins at the end of the 
maintenance period. The new arrangements for implementing monetary policy by 
the Bank of England envisage averaging with a wide corridor (100 basis points on 
either side of the official rate), to discourage use of standing facilities on a daily 
basis, but a narrower corridor (25 basis points on either side of the official rate) on 
the final day of the reserve maintenance period (Clews 2005, p. 211). 
 Thus, in the operational framework for the ‘New Consensus’ monetary policy, 
open market operations become redundant for the purpose of keeping the 
overnight interest rate close to the official interest rate. For example, the leading 
theoretician of the ‘new consensus’ Michael Woodford has argued that, even with 
the zero reserve requirement that is implied by his assumption of a ‘pure credit’ 
economy, all that is required to keep the overnight money market rate at the 
official rate is for the central bank to offer a deposit facility at the official rate 
(Woodford 2003, pp. 32, 33). However, this is because the deposit facility he 
envisages would only provide a risk-free asset to the banking system, giving the 
money market a benchmark rate of interest on such assets. In the ‘pure credit’ 
economy that he envisages, all autonomous movements in banks’ currency would 
be accommodated in ‘complete markets’. Hence not only the absence of reserve 
requirements, but also the reduction of the banking system’s autonomous reserve 
requirements for payments purposes to zero, would eliminate the need for open 
market operations. 
 However, Ulrich Bindseil has recently raised another issue that has not been 
discussed in the academic literature, although it appears among the practical 
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considerations that have been advanced in the establishment or reform of central 
bank operating procedures (eg Bank of England 2004). This is the degree to which 
open market operations that deprive the banking system of reserves in order to 
induce the borrowing of reserves from the central bank, thereby cause the central 
bank effectively to replace the activities of the money market (‘bringing the 
market into the bank’). His argument is that ‘open market operations should 
ensure that the recourse to standing facilities is not structural, but covers only non-
anticipated probabilistic needs… …Today, the essential argument advanced for 
open market operations is that they do not, in contrast to standing facilities offered 
at market rates, dry up the short-term inter-bank money market.’ (Bindseil 2004, 
pp. 144 and 177). His concern is to minimise the tendency of commercial banks to 
draw routinely on standing facilities. Unchecked, this may turn the central bank 
into a giro-clearing system for the banks, as the German Reichsbank was before 
the First World War. In such giro-clearing all autonomous movements in currency 
and reserves end up as book-keeping transfers in the central bank’s balance sheet. 
It would require central banks to price the riskiness of lending to individual banks 
on a routine day-to-day basis, something that they would prefer the money market 
to do (Clews 2005). This is an aspect of central banks’ operations in money 
markets that has not been adequately discussed in the academic literature. 
 The reduced scope of open market operations is reflected in the reduction of 
the Bank of England’s operations from two or three each day, to one each week, 
plus another operation on the last day of each maintenance period, although 
additional open market operations will be undertaken to prevent a build-up of 
reserves that would render the banking system independent of the central bank’s 
official rate (Clews 2005). In the ‘New Consensus’, in which monetary aggregates 
are no longer supposed to matter, but monetary policy is conducted by movements 
in the official rate of interest, the new function of open market operations is not a 
monetary, one in the sense that the scale of these operations is unrelated to the rate 
of interest that the central bank seeks to enforce in the money markets, or to the 
monetary policy stance that the central bank is adopting, ie, the trend in interest 
rates that the central bank seeks to indicate to the financial markets. The function 
of open market operations in the new consensus is to prevent settlement banks 
from ‘forcing the money markets into the bank’ by using remunerated standing 
facilities as a form of cash management service. 
 The present operating procedures of the European Central Bank (detailed in 
European Central Bank 2005) may be summarised as conducting open market 
operations in such a way as to accommodate changes in the predicted autonomous 
movements in reserves of settlement banks as a whole, while leaving the money 
market to distribute the required reserves among banks. In this way, only marginal 
differences between reserve requirements and autonomous reserve movements out 
of the banking system have to be accommodated by standing facilities 
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)RB(AM tttt −≡−  (4.2) 
 
Above those marginal differences, open market operations are merely matched by 
off-setting standing facilities. The scale of open market operations is therefore 
maintained at the lowest level consistent with enforcement of the official interest 
rate in the money market. This is the system which the Bank of England is now 
adopting, although using voluntary reserve requirements, rather than the 
compulsory ones in effect in the Euro-zone area (Clews 2005). 
 Two points may be made in conclusion to this section. First of all, despite the 
rhetorical denunciation of day-to-day bank reserve management in the ‘new 
consensus’, reserve requirements continue to have their rationale in the day-to-day 
implementation of monetary policy in supplementing the effectiveness of open 
market operations, rather than in the prudent conduct of banking business. 
Secondly, the current reform of money market operations by the Bank of England 
is not only a reaffirmation of the targeting of overnight interest rates through 
procedures common now in Europe, Canada and New Zealand. It is also a 
recognition that the scale of open market operations that were required by the 
previous management of bank reserves and liquidity was ‘bringing the money 
market into the Bank’. As recently as the Bank of England’s discussion around its 
last reform of procedures in 1997, open market operations were treated as more or 
less perfect substitutes for standing facilities (Bank of England 1997). 
 
 
5 Autonomous movements in bank reserves 
So far this paper has not gone into the question of what constitutes the 
‘movements in autonomous factors’ that are the basis of central banks’ 
accommodation of the reserve requirements of the banking system as a whole. 
These movements can formally be divided up into: 
 
– The change in the amount of banknotes in circulation; plus 
– The change in government deposits; plus 
– Net purchases by the central bank of foreign currencies. 
 
(There is also a small item referred to somewhat broadly as ‘other factors (net)’. 
However, this is a balancing item that includes all the remaining balance sheet 
items affecting money market liquidity. See European Central Bank 2001, pp. 74–
75.) 
 The change in the amount of banknotes in circulation is affected by largely 
predictable seasonal factors (eg cash withdrawals by the public before shopping 
festivals such as Christmas), as well as long-term trends towards cash-less 
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payment. Changes in banknote circulation affect the level of reserves of the 
banking system because their holding of central bank notes is included in bank 
reserves, and because banks obtain additional banknotes by drawing down on 
their reserve accounts at the central bank. 
 The change in government deposits is a key, and controversial element in 
autonomous factors. Payments to the government reduce the outstanding deposits 
of the banking system. A part of the monetarist monetary control doctrine was the 
view that the net fiscal deficit was an addition to the deposits of the banking 
system. Moreover, in many developing countries government paper is a major 
part of the assets of central and commercial banks. Trading in government paper 
is an important part of the liquidity management of banks, that was recognised 
notably in the Radcliffe Report (Kahn 1972). There is a tendency to overlook the 
importance for monetary policy of such trading. For example, the recent literature 
around the operating procedures of monetary policy naturally emphasises the 
effect on overnight interest rates of central bank management of the reserve base 
of the banking system. In a situation in which banks can only obtain reserves from 
each other or by accommodation from the central bank, failure to accommodate a 
shortage of reserves in the banking system, or to remove excess reserves from the 
system, would give rise to extreme fluctuations in overnight interest rates (eg 
Davies 1998). 
 In fact banks can ‘force’ the provision of reserves, or decline to surrender 
excess reserves, by reducing their purchases of short-term Government paper. By 
allowing their existing holdings of Treasury bills to mature without replacement 
with other paper, the banking system as a whole can obtain reserves transferred 
from the Government account at the central bank. To avoid this, the Government 
debt managers would have to offer a higher yield on Treasury bills. In this way 
the stability of the overnight rate of interest may be obtained at the cost 
destabilising other rates of interest. (If the Government holds its account with a 
commercial, settlement bank, rather than the central bank, then the Government’s 
commercial bank becomes the supplier of reserves ‘forced’ in this way by the rest 
of the banking system.)  If the Treasury bills market dries up, banks can ‘force’ 
reserves (means of inter-bank settlement) from each other by allowing company 
paper to expire without buying replacement paper. If the company paper market 
dries up as well, banks can sell foreign exchange, forcing reserves from banks that 
buy it, or from the central bank if it intervenes to avoid the appreciation of the 
domestic monetary unit. In all these cases, the re-distribution of reserves among 
commercial banks may occur not at an equilibrium rate of interest established in 
the overnight market for reserves, but at the cost of potentially destabilising 
movements in other prices for short-term financial assets. In theory such 
movements should not exceed the ‘corridor’ of interest rates available on standing 
facilities. In practice, such movements need only be sufficient to arouse 
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expectations of further movements in the future, for those prices to succumb to 
speculative instability. 
 In effect, Government paper is in varying degrees a substitute for central bank 
reserves. The relatively recent (more or less since the establishment of modern 
reserve banking just prior to the First World War) emphasis on banks’ reserve 
accounts at the central bank as final means of settlement of payment between 
banks, has tended to obscure the use for that function of Treasury bills before 
reserve banking was established, and along-side it afterwards. The decline of the 
Treasury bill market in the U.K. in recent years may also have contributed to 
promoting the notion that reserves at the central bank are the only possible means 
of settlement between banks. 
 Banks use of such substitutes may be expected to vary with the yields on 
maturing Treasury bills, relative to the rate of interest on standing facilities. If the 
rate on borrowed reserves is lower than that on maturing Treasury bills, it would 
pay to borrow reserves and invest in Treasury bills. If the rate of interest on 
reserve deposits is higher than on Treasury bills, then a profit may be obtained by 
allowing Treasury bills to mature, and investing the proceeds in reserve deposits. 
The overall effect would be to drive Treasury bill rates towards the extremes of 
the standing facilities ‘corridor’ of interest rates. In this situation, open market 
operations, to supply reserves in place of borrowed ones or to reduce reserve 
deposits, would tend to accelerate the movement of Treasury bill yields towards 
the extremes of the ‘corridor’. Hence, the narrower the corridor, the more stable is 
likely to be the rate of interest on maturing Treasury bills. 
 The other autonomous factor, which may be mentioned here, is net purchases 
by the central bank of foreign currencies. Recent discussion of central bank 
operations (eg Bindseil 2004, Woodford 2003, Bank of England 2004, European 
Central Bank 2001) have tended to ignore this factor, in line with the monetary 
policy doctrine, prevalent in particular after the collapse of the Argentine currency 
board, that favours floating exchange rates. This may be an appropriate 
simplification in relatively closed economies, such as the United States or the 
Euro-zone; or even in countries whose structural trade surpluses, such as Japan, 
give them a sustainable trade position irrespective of the exchange rate. However, 
it is not appropriate in the case of many developing and newly-industrialised 
economies, whose small domestic market, relative to their foreign trade, means 
that import prices have a major influence on the domestic price level. In such 
relatively smaller economies, the domestic rate of interest cannot be set without 
consideration of the effect that the domestic rate might have on capital flows. 
With a liberalised capital account, the central bank is obliged to enter the foreign 
exchange market, to stabilise the effect on the exchange rate, and hence on the 
domestic price level, of foreign capital flows. 
 The considerable influence of the exchange rate on the domestic price level, is 
a distinctive feature of developing and smaller, more open, economies. At the 
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very least this influence qualifies the neo-Wicksellian view according to which 
the rate of inflation is determined solely by the difference between the (domestic) 
‘natural’ rate of interest (the marginal productivity of capital), and the (domestic) 
money rate of interest set by the central bank. At the same time, a narrow 
orientation of open market operations towards stabilising the over-night rate of 
interest on bank reserves may cause the central bank to overlook developments in 
asset prices further out along the yield curve. In section seven below it is argued 
that the central bank cannot avoid influencing asset prices, in particular prices of 
financial assets, and experience suggests that a central bank can stabilise such 
prices (Goodhart and Dai 2003). 
 
 
6 Open market operations and financial 
development 
The commonly accepted definition of financial development is the creation of 
more liquid markets in longer-term securities. The classic statement of this was 
made forty-five years ago in Gurley and Shaw (1960). However, it nowadays 
includes an increasing range of short-term securities, such as futures and foreign 
exchange contracts. By increasing the scale of financial transactions financial 
development increases the autonomous movements in reserves. By making 
financial markets generally more liquid, financial development reduces the impact 
that given central bank open market operations have on interest rates in the money 
market whose instruments now find more ready substitutes among more liquid 
longer-term securities. Financial development also increases the amount of bank 
deposits in the system. If the money supply is divided up into ‘outside’ money 
that is the liability of the central bank, and ‘inside’ money, that is made up of 
liabilities of commercial banks, financial development may be viewed as the 
expansion of ‘inside’ money relative to ‘outside’ money. (This is the origin of the 
now standard use of the ratio of M3 to M0 as an indicator of financial 
development, eg King and Levine 1993.) In turn, the increase in ‘inside’ money 
relative to ‘outside’ money makes it more difficult to enforce the official rate of 
interest in the money market. At the same time, the increased reserves that would 
have to be held against such deposits would tend to ‘bring the money market into 
the central bank’. 
 Financial development has two effects on the autonomous movement of 
reserves in the banking system that are relevant here. On the one hand there is, 
with a constant value of individual transactions, a Jevons-type ‘Law of Large 
Numbers’ effect, tending to stabilise the net outflow of reserves from the banking 
system, as more transactions increase the tendency of outflows and inflows to 
cancel each other out. This effect stabilises outflows most in the initial increase in 
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the numbers of transactions, so that with financial development it is of 
diminishing importance. The other effect is the tendency with financial 
development for transactions to get larger, with the growing importance of 
money-centre activities and large-scale securities trading. This combines with 
secular trends and medium-term cyclical movements in transactions that directly 
involve large movements in bank reserves (for example, international movements 
in bank deposits or changes in the fiscal position of the government). This effect 
would tend to increase the scale of autonomous movements in bank reserves. (The 
other factor in the scale of autonomous movements in bank reserves has 
historically been banks’ transactions in international reserves, namely gold, during 
the period of the gold standard, and foreign currency, in the case of emerging 
markets today. Capital account liberalisation obviously increases the scale of open 
market operations necessary to keep monetary aggregates stable. As was 
mentioned in section 4, small open economies may still require large scale open 
market operations in foreign assets to keep the exchange rate stable.) 
 In Patinkin’s neo-classical Keynesian interpretation, financial innovation 
means that, for a given level of nominal aggregate demand, less money is 
demanded, because securities are more liquid: ‘…the result of developing 
nonbanking financial intermediaries is to provide ultimate lenders with the 
possibility of purchasing a security which is more attractive (more “liquid”) than 
the primary securities issued by the ultimate borrowers’ (Patinkin 1972, p. 46; 
Gurley and Shaw 1960, pp. 123–126). In a later postscript, Patinkin argued that 
the effect of this is to increase the amount of open market operations required to 
obtain a given change in the real rate of interest: 
 ‘…the existence of [non-bank] financial intermediaries does not, in principle, 
impair the efficacy of open-market policy. Theoretically, it only affects the 
conditions under which the monetary authorities operate in the bond market: that 
is, it affects the volume of operations that the authorities must carry out in order to 
establish a given rate of interest.’ (Patinkin 1972, p. 54.) In the non-stochastic, 
static, general equilibrium model that Patinkin was describing, open market 
operations were only necessary to change interest rates, after which a stable 
equilibrium would emerge. By contrast, the autonomous movements in the reserve 
position of the banking system as a whole, given in equation 2.1 and in this 
section, are usually modelled as being subject to stochastic shocks, even though in 
practice they are largely predictable (see previous section 5). Moreover, it should 
be pointed out that open market operations can only directly influence the nominal 
rate of interest. The eventual real rate of interest depends on the course of price 
inflation over the period after a security has been issued. The demand for money 
that Patinkin had in mind was the demand for real money balances, in relation to 
the real rate of interest. To put this in the context of the new consensus monetary 
policy, it is necessary to convert this demand, and supply through open market 
operations, as well as the real rate of interest, back into nominal values. This is 
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easily done by multiplying through by the price level that was originally used to 
obtain real variables. With a flatter, more interest-rate elastic demand curve for 
money, or for the reserves held against bank deposits, financial development 
requires a central bank to increase the amount of open market operations 
necessary to enforce a given change in the rate of interest. By contrast, in the 
‘New Consensus’ the policy of the central bank is orientated towards stabilising 
the overnight rate of interest around its official rate, by off-setting (through open 
market operations or standing facilities) autonomous movements in the reserves of 
the banking system as a whole.  If those autonomous movements increase in scale, 
as they would with capital account liberalisation in emerging markets, or with the 
expansion of money centre activities, then the amount of off-setting that has to be 
undertaken by the central bank is correspondingly increased. 
 As has already been noted, financial development involves the more rapid 
expansion of ‘inside’ money, that is a liability of the banking system, relative to 
the ‘outside’ money (bank reserves plus cash) that remains a liability of the 
government, or of the central bank. (Patinkin 1972). Financial development and 
the more rapid growth of ‘inside’ money obviously increases the range of credit 
activity that may be undertaken on the basis of a given quantity of bank reserves. 
At the same time, for any positive reserve requirements, actual reserves that have 
to be kept in the banking system rise with the gross, rather than the net liabilities 
of the system. Any loan that is granted, for example, against the collateral of long-
term securities, becomes on its use as payment a deposit against which additional 
reserves have to be set aside in a liability-based reserve system. This is true a 
fortiori of asset-based reserves, such as the Basel Accord system. (In this respect, 
the composition of household sector financial assets may give a misleading 
impression of the changes taking place in the course of financial development. 
There is undoubtedly a reduction in the share of bank deposits in household sector 
financial assets, but bank balance sheets in fact have been mainly expanded by the 
growth of money centre banking activity. Cf. Palley 2004, and Toporowski 2006.) 
 Without a change in open market operations to accommodate the structural 
increase in reserves required by the banking system, there would be a rising 
demand for reserves from standing facilities. This would tend to ‘bring the money 
market into the central bank’, making the central bank the first supplier of 
reserves in case of need. The money market would then tend to ‘dry up’. If 
standing facilities were capped, then interest rates in the money market would 
tend to rise. If the central bank supplies reserves through open market operations, 
then net sales will fall off and may even be transformed, at a given reserve 
requirement, into net purchases. Over an extended period, a structural requirement 
may emerge within the banking system for good quality, risk-free assets for the 
central bank to buy in exchange for reserves. Were this to become an effective 
constraint, a central bank would be under pressure to reduce reserve requirements 
making it even more dependent on open market operations to enforce the official 
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rate of interest in the money market. (Harri Hasko has pointed out to me that, in 
the case of the European Central Bank, the good collateral held by banks available 
for open market operations has amounted to some €7–10 trillions, compared to the 
amount traded in particular open market interventions of some €300m. In the 
initial period of fixed rate tenders, banks were tendering for up to €7 trillions, 
effectively seeking to exchange the whole of their portfolio of good assets for 
reserves!) 
 Thus the current success of the European Central Bank in controlling 
overnight interest rates with its current open market operations and the existing 
level of reserve requirements, may not be sufficient to secure such control in the 
future. The much planned and anticipated European financial integration project 
may well make the existing scale of operations and reserve requirements less 
efficient. Without changes in operating procedures: an increased scale of open 
market operations, with larger and possibly more frequent fine-tuning bond sales, 
and structural purchases of securities, together with adjustments in reserve 
requirements; the official rate may end up disconnected from money market rates, 
as it historically has been. 
 
 
7 The lender of last resort 
The issue of the central bank’s operations as a lender of last resort is a relevant 
consideration in the theory of optimum open market operations because of central 
banks’ preference, mentioned in the previous section, for the money markets 
themselves to assess the risks of banks. Excessive open market operations that 
‘bring the money market into the central bank balance sheet’ obviously involve 
the central bank in the routine assessment of counter-party bank risks. But when 
the central bank acts as a lender of last resort, the bank in effect takes on the most 
extreme bank risks. This leaves the money market to assess all the less extreme 
risks. Without specifying those risks it is difficult to judge what additional 
administrative burden would be involved in estimating an appropriate lending 
margin against those risks. But it may be that, once the central bank takes 
responsibility for extreme risks, the argument for not absorbing the money market 
into the central bank’s balance sheet is correspondingly weaker. 
 In the previous monetary regime, considerations of monetary control as well 
as market assessment of risks argued in favour of using open market operations to 
inject assistance into the money market. Milton Friedman had argued that bond 
purchases in the open market allowed distressed borrowers to obtain liquidity 
without going to the discount window or standing facilities when no-one else will 
lend (Friedman 1959). Indeed, following the large scale assistance given to 
Continental Illinois Bank through the discount window in May 1984, resort to the 
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discount window came to be associated with the ‘shame’ of inability to raise 
liquidity in the money markets. Humphrey & Keleher argued that open market 
operations have the advantage of speed as well as regulating the total amount of 
reserves, but not their allocation among particular users’ (Humphrey & Keleher 
1984). George Kaufman argued that: 
 ‘Reliance on open market operations to provide assistance reduces the 
political pressures on the LLR to assist all entities in financial distress – in 
particular, financially weak, but politically strong entities directly through the 
discount window… Only if the central bank had superior or more timely 
information about the nature of the crisis or the solvency of the participants 
involved than the market does, should providing assistance through the discount 
window dominate open market operations…Open market operations eliminate the 
need to price LLR assistance correctly…An administered penalty rate [per 
Bagehot] is by necessity an imprecise concept that is as likely to be mispriced as 
priced correctly.’ (Kaufman 1991). 
 The classic statement of monetarist central bank practice, Goodfriend and 
King (1988) urged that open market operations be used to supply reserves to the 
banking system, which could then allocate those reserves through the money 
market. If discount window assistance is provided, it should be sterilised, that is 
the central bank should sell in the open market the assets that it had bought 
through the discount window. In this way the overall reserve position of the 
banking system is kept constant, and the central bank in effect sells assets on 
behalf of the distressed bank. However, this procedure is considered to be inferior 
because it requires the central bank to monitor and supervise the bank to which 
assistance is being provided. Goodfriend and King contrast this ‘monetary policy’ 
with ‘banking’ by which unsterilised assistance is provided. 
 The policy of ‘banking’ was espoused by Charles Goodhart, who argued that 
discount window, or standing facility lending is the most efficacious means of 
intervention in the event of bank failure. He has associated this with the view that, 
in times of financial crisis, information asymmetries become extreme. Under such 
circumstances, the information widely available in the money market is simply 
inadequate for the purpose of properly calculating risk margins (Goodhart 1999, 
Goodhart and Illing 2002, Goodhart and Huang 1999). 
 The operating procedures recommended for the New Consensus Monetary 
Policy involve a significant reduction in the frequency and scale of open market 
operations. For example, in the U.K., weekly open market operations, plus 
another intervention at the end of each maintenance period, will replace between 
two and four open market operations each banking day (Tucker 2004). In this 
situation, entering the market to buy securities, the preferred method of 
intervention under the previous regime, becomes a highly visible way of 
conducting lender of last resort operations. If the market was unaware of possible 
distress among banking institutions, the market could not remain unaware 
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following such an intervention. Among the consequences would be a hunt to 
discover the identity of the weak, or potentially weak, institutions, if only to make 
a ‘market’ assessment of the risk they pose. It is difficult to imagine a more 
effective way of sowing panic in the money markets and thereby undermining 
their smooth functioning and routine risk assessment. 
 The new operating procedures will therefore favour lender of last resort 
operations by ‘banking’ means, a vindication of the Goodhart view. The issue that 
they pose for central bankers is whether to let distressed banks draw all their 
liquidity needs from the discount window or standing facilities; or whether banks 
applying for such facilities should not in some way be screened. For example, an 
individual bank drawing on such borrowing to an extent that might indicate 
possible distress, may be subject to further examination and, if necessary, also to a 
penalty rate for borrowing as indicated by Bagehot. In any case, the issue is less 
likely to fall within the scope of open market operations, unless a general shortage 
of liquidity emerges. 
 
 
8 Enforcing monetary policy 
In the New Consensus, monetary policy is targeted at regulating the rate of 
inflation. This can be illustrated by rearranging equation (4.1) to give 
 
ttx1tztzx1txxtrxt1t zzx)jr( ε+ηα+α+βα+βα+−βα=π−π +−+  (8.1) 
 
For a central bank, the previous period’s output gap, xt–1, and the other economic 
influences on inflation summarised in zt and zt+1, are all exogenous variables. The 
main instrument that the central bank has at its disposal is the rate of interest and, 
for operational purposes, the overnight rate of interest. However, it is widely 
known that the overnight rate of interest has a direct impact only on the 
participants in the money market. The effectiveness of the overnight rate of 
interest depends on the degree to which that rate influences longer-term rates, for 
example, monthly rates of interest which are supposed to determine the price of 
most household borrowing, and ten-to-twenty year rates, or even the indefinite 
rates on company stock, which are supposed to determine financing costs of 
business fixed investment (Bindseil, 2004, p. 249, Bank of England 1999). These 
are now commonly modelled as margins over overnight rates of interest. But these 
margins are by no means fixed and, with certain notable exceptions (eg Hawtrey 
1938, Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal and Howells 2002), there is little research 
conducted on the mechanisms responsible for movements in those margins, and 
the absolute levels of those longer-term rates. It is generally presumed that these 
 
27 
longer rates move up and down with changes in overnight rates of interest, and 
expectations concerning those changes. 
 As mentioned earlier, the literature on open market operations has developed 
some useful models demonstrating the effects of over-bidding and under-bidding 
on the eventual yield on securities bought or sold by tender in the process of open 
market operations (eg Ayuso & Repullo 2001). An important distinction in such 
operations arises between outright purchases and sales of securities, and 
repurchase, or reverse purchase, agreements. In the case of the latter, the absolute 
yield at which the two transactions (purchase, followed by sale back; or sale 
followed by purchase back) are conducted is unimportant. What matters is the 
margin in between the two prices of the transactions, representing the rate of 
interest on the reserves sold or bought in the market. For example, if a central 
bank wishes to enforce an official rate of 2% over the term of a repurchase 
agreement, then it will be indifferent between selling a bond at €100, for 
repurchase at €98, and selling that bond at €50 for repurchase at €49. However, in 
the case of outright purchases and sales of securities whose term matches the 
period in between regular open market operations, the price of the transaction and 
hence its absolute yield represents the effective rate of interest. 
 This distinction has important implications for the yield curve. There is an 
obvious convenience for central banks in trading longer-term securities in its open 
market operations. But the central banks’ indifference to the absolute yields on 
longer term securities does not mean that it is not influencing those yields by 
providing liquidity to the market for those securities, albeit through the balance 
sheets of participants in the money market (Keynes 1930, p. 371). As Patinkin 
pointed out, to persuade banks to purchase or sell a security, the central bank has 
to make its offer or bid price attractive relative to the price in the market for that 
security (Patinkin 1972). In this way, open market operations make the longer-
term rates of interest endogenous to the conduct of monetary policy. 
 This endogeneity of longer term rates of interest may be less apparent because 
the central bank can choose the instruments that it chooses to buy or sell in open 
market operations, ie where along the yield curve it intervenes. However, its 
provision of reserves against the collateral that it may choose does not mean that 
the central bank is not providing liquidity to other financial markets as well. In the 
final analysis, the liquidity of a market for a particular may be indicated by 
turnover in that market. But its main determinant is the liquidity of the portfolios 
held by participants in that market. It is, after all, the liquidity of their portfolios 
that determines their responsiveness to changes in relative yields along the yield 
curve. The provision of liquidity against particular, widely held, assets indirectly 
provides liquidity against other assets as well and, through their liquidity 
premium, influences their nominal yield. 
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9 Conclusion 
As was noted in section 6, financial development creates a growing structural 
need for reserves and possibly larger autonomous movements in bank reserves 
that would need to be off-set by larger open market operations to keep the targeted 
rate of interest stable. At the same time an increasing involvement of the central 
bank in managing the liquidity of the banking system would tend to be 
undermined by the increasing liquidity of short-term securities that can thus more 
effectively substitute for central bank reserves as means of payment. In this 
situation, the central bank faces a choice between increasing the scale of its open 
market operations, in order to make its preferred rate of interest hold in the 
market, or increasingly relying on the ‘signalling’ effect of its official rates of 
interest. Open market operations have the additional property of influencing 
directly or indirectly liquidity and yields in other markets. This is obviously 
desirable given the much greater importance of medium and longer-term rates of 
interest in the monetary transmission mechanism. However, if they do have that 
greater importance, then it is those rates of interest that should be targeted, rather 
than overnight rates of interest. 
 Secondly, the theoretical literature on the New Consensus is neo-Wicksellian 
in explicitly identifying the difference between a ‘natural’ rate of interest (the 
marginal product of capital) and the money rate of interest as the cause of changes 
in the value of money. This may be plausible in large, relatively closed, 
economies, and is reflected in the exclusion of foreign exchange transactions from 
the monetary policy operations in the central bank balance sheet used by authors 
such as Bindseil (2004). But for the majority of smaller, open, economies, and in 
particular in developing and the newly-industrialised countries, the exchange rate 
is a major influence on the domestic price level. In such economies, the open 
market operations of the central bank can only exclude operations in the foreign 
exchange markets at the cost of making those economies subject to inflationary 
and deflationary international capital flows. The sterilisation of such flows (by the 
sale of domestic bonds and the purchase of foreign bonds, in the case of an 
inflow, reversing into the purchase of domestic bonds and the sale of foreign 
bonds) may help to stabilise bond markets. But they would need to be linked to 
foreign currency interventions if they are to be made effective in exchange-rate 
sensitive economies. Moreover, an implication of this is that, in the financial 
markets of a country whose currency has reserve currency status, it is not just the 
central bank of that country that is conducting open market operations. Other 
central banks are also operating in that currency and using deposits in that 
currency as means of settlement in foreign exchange transactions. In this way, in 
globally integrated banking markets, no central bank can isolate its open market 
operations from the foreign exchange market. Nor can targeting of the overnight 
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rate of interest assure monetary stability as financial development increases the 
availability and liquidity of substitute reserves. 
 
 
30 
References 
Ayuso, J – Repullo, R (2001) A Model of the Open Market Operations of the 
European Central Bank. Economic Journal Vol. 113, 893–902. 
 
Bank of England (1983) The Bank of England’s operational procedures for 
meeting monetary objectives. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin June. 
 
Bank of England (1997) The Bank of England’s operations in the sterling 
money markets. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin May. 
 
Bank of England (1999) The transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin May, 161–170. 
 
Bank of England (2004) Reform of the Bank of England’s operations in the 
sterling money markets. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Summer, 217–
227. 
 
Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal, I – Howells, P (2002) Central Banks and Market 
Interest Rates. Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics, Vol. 24, No. 4, 569–
586. 
 
Bindseil, U (2004) Monetary Policy Implementation, Theory, Past and 
Present. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Clews, R (2005) Implementing monetary policy: reforms to the Bank of 
England’s operations in the money market. Bank of England Quarterly 
Bulletin Summer, 211–220. 
 
Davies, H (1998) Averaging in a framework of zero reserve requirements: 
implications for the operation of monetary policy. Bank of England 
Discussion Paper London. 
 
European Central Bank (2001) The Monetary Policy of the ECB Frankfurt. 
 
European Central Bank (2005) The Implementation of Monetary Policy in the 
Euro Area, General Documentation on Eurosystem Monetary Policy and 
Procedures. Frankfurt, February. 
 
 
31 
Flannery, M J (1996) Financial Crises, Payment System Problems, and 
Discount Window Lending. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 28, 
804–824. 
 
Friedman, B M (1999) The Future of Monetary Policy: The Central Bank as 
an Army with Only a Signal Corps. International Finance, Vol. 2, 321–338. 
 
Friedman, M (1959) A Program for Monetary Stability. New York: Fordham 
University Press. 
 
Goodfriend, M – King, R G (1988) Financial Deregulation, Monetary Policy, 
and Central Banking. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic 
Review, Vol. 74, No. 3, May-June, 216–253. 
 
Goodhart, C A E (1999) Myths about the Lender of Last Resort. International 
Finance, Vol. 2, No. 3. 
 
Goodhart, C A E – Illing, G (eds) (2004) Financial Crises, Contagion, and the 
Lender of Last Resort A Reader. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Goodhart, C A E – Huang, H (1999) A Model of the Lender of Last Resort. 
IMF Working Paper WP/99/39 March. 
 
Goodhart, C A E – Dai, L (2003) Intervention to Save Hong Kong: The 
Authorities’ Counter-Speculation in Financial Markets. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2003. 
 
Gurley, J G – Shaw, E S (1960) Money in a Theory of Finance. Washington: 
The Brookings Institution. 
 
Hawtrey, R G (1938) The Art of Central Banking. London: Longmans. 
 
Humphrey, T M – Keleher, R E (1984) The Lender of Last Resort: A Historical 
Perspective. Cato Journal 4/1, Spring/Summer. 
 
Kahn, R F (1972) Notes on Liquidity Preference. In Selected Essays on 
Employment and Growth Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kaufman, G (1991) Lender of Last Resort: A Contemporary Perspective. 
Journal of Financial services Research, Vol. 5, 95–110. 
 
 
32 
Keleher, R (1999) An International Lender of Last Resort, the IMF and the 
Federal Reserve. Joint Economic Committee Report of the US Congress, 
February. 
 
Keynes, J M (1930) A Treatise on Money, ii: The Applied Theory of Money. 
London: Macmillan. 
 
Keynes, J M (1945) Notes to the National Debt Inquiry. In D Moggridge (ed.) 
The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes Vol. XXVII Activities 
1940–1946: Shaping the Post-War World, Employment and Commodities 
London: Macmillan and Cambridge University Press 1980. 
 
King, R – Levine, R (1993) Financial Intermediation and Economic 
Development. In C Mayer and X Vives (eds.) Financial Intermediation and 
the Construction of Europe London: Centre for Economic Policy and 
Research. 
 
Meigs, J A (1962) Free Reserves and the Money Supply. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press. 
 
Patinkin, D (1972) Financial Intermediaries and the Logical Structure of 
Monetary Theory. In Studies in Monetary Economics New York: Harper and 
Row. 
 
Poole, W (1970) Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Simple 
Stochastic Macro Model. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, 197–
216. 
 
Schwartz, A (1992) The misuse of the Fed’s discount window. Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis Review Sep./Oct., 58–69. 
 
Simons, H C (1946) Debt Policy and Banking Policy. In Economic Policy for a 
Free Society Chicago: Chicago University Press 1948. 
 
Toporowski, J (2006) Asset-based reserve requirements: Some reservations. 
Review of Political Economy, forthcoming. 
 
Tucker, P (2004) Managing the central bank’s balance sheet: where monetary 
policy meets financial stability. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 
Autumn, 359–382. 
 
 
33 
Välimäki, T (2003) Central bank tenders: three essays on money market 
liquidity auctions. Bank of Finland Studies No. E26. 
 
Woodford, M (2003) Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of 
Monetary Policy. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
 
 
 
 BANK OF FINLAND RESEARCH 
DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
ISSN 0785-3572, print; ISSN 1456-6184, online 
 
1/2006 Etunimi Sukunimi  Otsikko. 2006. xx p. ISBN 952-462-, print; ISBN 952-462-, 
online. 
 
 
 
 
 
